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Abstract
We analyze bidding behavior in auctions when risk-averse bidders
bid for an object whose value is risky. We show that, as risk increases,
decreasingly risk-averse bidders will reduce their bids by more than
the risk premium. Ceteris paribus, bidders will be better oﬀ bidding
for a more risky object in ￿rst-price, second-price, English, and all-
pay auctions with aﬃliated private values. We then extend the results
to common value settings. This ￿precautionary bidding￿ eﬀect arises
because the expected marginal utility of income increases with risk,
so bidders are reluctant to bid so highly. We show that precautionary
bidding also arises in response to common values risk. This precau-
tionary bidding behavior can make decreasingly risk-averse bidders
better oﬀ when they face a ￿winner￿s curse￿ than when they do not.
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1￿It￿s kind of like Christmas. Except that you are afraid it
w o n ￿ tm e e ty o u re x p e c t a t i o n s . B u tm o s to fi td o e s . ￿ ￿L y n n e
Strauss, antique collector, on buying antiques in on-line auctions
(quoted in The New York Times, November 12, 1998).
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In many real world auctions the value of the goods for sale is subject to
ex post risk. At the time of the sale, bidders can only estimate the value
of the object and they are well aware that the true value to them will be
revealed only some time after the sale. Part of this risk is what can be
termed as winner￿s curse risk: uncertainty about other buyers￿ (or the seller￿s)
information which is not revealed in the course of the auction. However, there
is also almost invariably pure risk in the valuations, arising from information
that none of the buyers (nor the seller) can obtain, which will be resolved
after the object has been allocated. The sale of oil tracts, art, antiques,
wine, and procurement contracts provide obvious examples which exhibit
both types of risk. In each case, there is something about the future resale
price, authenticity, quality, etc., of these goods which cannot be perfectly
foreseen, and which from the bidders￿ point of view is just pure white noise.
Almost all of these risks are present in internet auctions also, which have
recently received much attention.1
Despite the ubiquity of pure ex post risk, there has to date been no
analysis of its eﬀect on the bidding behavior of risk-averse agents.2 The
core of this paper is devoted to providing such an analysis, with somewhat
surprising results. We then draw out the implications of the results on pure
ex post risk for common value risk.3
1The New York Times (November 12, 1998) documents the risks involved in buying
antiques in on-line auctions - the item purchased may be damaged, a fake, or may even
never arrive. ￿The web is a suberb place to sell bad stuﬀ... [internet] auctions are a great
way to get rid of things you can￿t sell any other way ￿ something that has damage, or has
been repaired, or is a fake.￿ Recent academic papers analyzing internet auctions include
Bajari and Horta￿su (2000), Lucking-Reiley et al. (1999) and Roth and Ockenfels (2000).
2Bidders display risk aversion in a variety of auction scenarios. For a survey of the
experimental evidence see Kagel (1995). Econometric evidence based on data from timber
auctions is provided by Paarsch (1992), Athey and Levin (2001) and Campo et al. (2000).
3The eﬀect of the winner￿s curse has been studied in the literature with risk neutral
bidders; we will adopt the framework of the seminal work of Milgrom and Weber (1982).
2Our ￿rst result is to show that in all common auction forms (￿rst price,
second price, English and all-pay auctions), decreasingly absolute risk-averse
(DARA) bidders will reduce their bids by more than the risk premium as
pure risk increases. This implies that bidders will be better oﬀ bidding for a
more risky object, ceteris paribus.
In the ￿rst price and all-pay auctions, bidders eﬀectively engage in ￿pre-
cautionary bidding.￿ As with precautionary saving, when agents face a risk
their marginal utility of income rises.4 This causes bidders to bid less ag-
gressively because they value more highly each extra dollar of income, as
compared to the increased probability of winning the object. This result is
not obvious for the following reason. Under some conditions, decreasingly
risk-averse individuals become more risk-averse in facing one risk (i.e., losing
the object) when they are forced to face an independent risk (i.e., object
value).5 Since increasing the degree of risk aversion leads to more aggressive
bidding in a ￿rst price auction,6 we might therefore expect that increasing
the riskiness of the object would make bidders more risk-averse and so raise
bids and make them worse oﬀ. However, this latter eﬀect turns out to be of
second order compared to the precautionary bidding eﬀect. Precisely when
bidders have decreasing absolute risk aversion, the precautionary bidding ef-
fect is large enough to make bidders better oﬀ when they are bidding for a
risky object than a safe one.
In the second-price and English auctions the bidders also reduce their
bids by more than the value of the risk premium. But though the conditions
for the eﬀect to occur are the same (i.e., DARA), the intuition behind it
is slightly diﬀerent. Recall that in these auctions the bidders submit bids
assuming that they will receive zero surplus from winning whenever they
win.7 This means that in the presence of noise, bidders with decreasing
absolute risk aversion will reduce their bids by the large risk premium that
would be required if their surplus were zero. But when they actually win, the
bidders will have a positive surplus on average and their expected payment
4See Leland (1968), Sandmo (1970), DrŁze and Modigliani (1972), and more recently,
Kimball (1990).
5See Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987), Kimball (1993), Eeckhoudt et al (1996).
6This result has been established by Butters (1975), Matthews (1979), Holt (1980),
Riley and Samuelson (1981), Maskin and Riley (1984).
7In second price and English auctions, one￿s bid does not directly aﬀect how much one
will pay, only under which circumstances one wins, so bidders should be increase their
bids up to the point where they are indiﬀerent to winning.
3will have been reduced by a risk premium that was too large. So overall
they will be better oﬀ. This decreasing risk premium eﬀe c ti sd i s t i n c tf r o m
precautionary bidding. Notice, in particular, that it arises in the absence of
any strategic eﬀect on the part of the bidders.
Up until now, the auction literature has completely abstracted from the
issue of pure ex post risk. We show that this abstraction is fully justi￿ed
only in the case of CARA preferences. Bidders with CARA preferences
reduce their bids by exactly the risk premium in all the above auction types
and thus they are indiﬀerent to the introduction of symmetric risk in their
values. With CARA bidders, one could equally well analyze a ￿certainty
equivalent auction￿ where all bidders￿ initial values are adjusted downwards
by the amount of the risk premium and then proceed as if there were no ex
post risk on the object. By contrast, this is not true for DARA bidders. The
latter are not indiﬀe r e n tt oe xp o s tr i s k ,b u ti n s t e a dp o s i t i v e l yb e n e ￿tf r o m
the introduction of this type of uncertainty. Hence they have no incentive
at all to collectively reduce the risks they face. We might even expect to see
DARA bidders attempting to collectively commit not to acquire information
about shocks which might aﬀect their payoﬀs (e.g. not doing test drilling on
a tract of oil for sale) if such actions are publicly observable.
The results also imply that a seller facing bidders with DARA preferences
has an incentive to reduce the riskiness of the valuations. This is not simply
because the risk reduction directly increases the bidders￿ willingness to pay ￿
but also because it limits precautionary bidding and thus intensi￿es compe-
tition. Even a seller who is as risk-averse as the bidders will wish to provide
insurance against the noise, if this is possible. This result may provide an
explanation for the cooling-oﬀ rights found in some auctions.8 By contrast,
if the seller￿s objective function contains elements other than expected pro￿t
(e.g., popularity of the auction) then it could be a good idea to auction
goods whose value is uncertain. Auctions with risky objects may become
very popular with DARA bidders who think that there is a large surplus to
be made. It is important to see that this eﬀect arises with risk-averse buyers
rather than risk-loving ones, and that the popularity of risky auctions is thus
completely rational. This observation could help to explain the widespread
popularity of on-line auctions: despite the evident risks involved in purchas-
ing unseen goods from a complete stranger, risk-averse bidders do well out
of such auctions, and participation in them need not be viewed as a form of
8See Asker (2000) for more discussion of auctions with cooling-oﬀ rights.
4addictive gambling, as has sometimes been suggested in the popular press.
Our ￿nding that the seller would like to reduce the white noise faced
by buyers is distinct from the linkage principle (due to Milgrom and We-
ber [1982]). This principle implies that the seller should commit to reveal
any information aﬃliated with the buyers￿ signals because the commitment
reduces the winner￿s curse that the buyers face. Note, however, that the
winner￿s curse arises because winning provides information about the value
of the object, in which case even risk-neutral bidders should bid less aggres-
sively. Conversely, it is completely possible for the private value of an object
to an individual to be risky without any winner￿s curse implications for bid-
ding; this will be the case when knowing that one is the winner provides no
additional information about the value of the object. An obvious distinction
between the linkage principle and the eﬀects of white noise that we will focus
on in this paper is that precautionary bidding will arise only when bidders are
decreasingly risk-averse, whereas the linkage principle will hold even when
bidders are risk-neutral, but have aﬃliated common values.
The behavior of risk-averse bidders in an environment with aﬃliated com-
mon values has to our knowledge been hardly studied at all. Towards the
end of this paper we use the analysis of precautionary bidding to throw more
light on this topic. We show that DARA bidders engage in precautionary
bidding in response to the risk inherent in other bidders￿ signals not revealed
i nt h ec o u r s eo ft h ea u c t i o n . B e c a u s eo ft h i s ,d e c r e a s i n g l yr i s k - a v e r s eb i d -
ders may be better oﬀ in a common values than in a private values setting,
something which will never arise with risk-neutral bidders. Thus what is a
winner￿s curse to risk-neutral bidders can sometimes be a blessing to risk-
averse bidders.
The comparison of common and private values auctions from the buyers￿
point of view is of practical importance because in some settings the bid-
ders may be able to choose between entering auctions where they will face
winner￿s curse risk and where they will not. In some cases this may be a
straight choice about what type of object to buy. In other potential appli-
cations, whether an auction is largely a private or common values aﬀair may
be determined by prior moves taken by the bidders. For example, consider
two ￿rms which will later compete in procurement auctions. If ￿ prior to the
auctions ￿ these two ￿rms choose similar production technologies then the
subsequent auctions will have a strong common-value component: one ￿rm￿s
estimate of the likely cost of ful￿lling the contract is likely to be important
information for the other ￿rm. But if the two ￿rms choose two very diﬀerent
5technologies then they will have mostly private valuations for the contract.
Our results suggest that if the ￿rms are DARA then they will choose more
similar technologies in order to bene￿t from the softened bidding that the
winner￿s curse risk generates. Similar remarks apply to the choice of cus-
tomer base by car, art, wine and antique retailers who buy their product in
wholesale auctions. By choosing to serve customers with similar tastes they
mitigate competition in the wholesale auction and the reduction in compe-
tition eﬀect would counteract the bidders￿ desire to diﬀerentiate themselves.
These and other applications and testable predictions are spelled out in more
detail throughout the paper.
The paper is laid out as follows. In order to investigate the eﬀect of pure
risk on bidding behavior in isolation, we begin in section 2 by abstracting
from the common-value framework and analyzing a model where bidders have
aﬃliated private values. Then in section 3 we consider the consequences of
adding white noise to the prize in common values auctions, and are able to
prove the same result: that decreasingly risk-averse bidders will bene￿tf r o m
more risk in the good￿s value. In section 4 we show how the winner￿s curse
can be a blessing for risk-averse buyers (they may be better oﬀ in a common
rather than a private values auction). For the sake of fair comparison, we
consider a natural (rent-preserving) mapping from common values to private
values settings and show that whenever risk-neutral bidders are indiﬀerent
between the two settings, DARA bidders strictly prefer the common values
auction. Finally in Section 5 we oﬀer concluding remarks.
2T h e a ﬃliated private values model
Assume that there are n potential buyers for a given object. The seller￿s
reservation value for the good is zero. Buyer i￿s best estimate for the private
monetary value of the object is represented by his type, θi ∈ [θ,¯ θ], θ > 0.
The joint ex ante distribution of (θi,θ−i) has a positive density f(θ),
and is symmetric and aﬃliated.9 Denote the conditional density of θ
(1)
−i ≡
maxj6=i{θj} given θi by f(y |θi), and the associated cumulative distribution
by F(y |θi).S i n c eθi and θ
(1)
−i are also aﬃliated, the conditional distribution
of θ
(1)





i for all θi ≥ θ
0
i;t h a ti s , ∂
∂θiF(y |θi) ≤ 0. The intuition behind this
9For the de￿nition and properties of aﬃliation see Milgrom and Weber (1982).
6property is simple: if types are aﬃliated (￿positively correlated￿) then for a
larger θi the highest among {θj}j6=i is likely to be larger.10
The ex post monetary value of the object for buyer i is θi + zi,w h e r ezi
is the realization of a zero-mean random variable ˜ zi. We assume that the ˜ zi￿s
come from a symmetric joint distribution and that each ˜ zi is independent
of (θi,θ−i).11 The noise is ex interim unobservable and uninsurable. When
the ˜ zi￿s are degenerate, ˜ zi ≡ 0, we say that the buyers have deterministic
valuations,a n dw h e nt h e˜ zi￿s are non-degenerate, we say that they have
noisy valuations. Note that we can interpret this ￿noise term￿ aﬀecting
bidders￿ values in either of two ways. First, it could be a result of common
shocks (such as a change in the oil price or the amount of oil underground);
or second, it could be buyer-speci￿c symmetrically distributed shocks (such
as unforeseen production costs).
The buyers evaluate their monetary surplus (consisting of their initial
wealth minus the transfer paid to the seller, plus the object￿s value when they
win) according to a strictly concave utility function, u, and they are expected
utility maximizers. We normalize their initial wealth and u(0) to zero, and
assume that the object is valuable even for the lowest type, Eu(θ +˜ zi) > 0.
We will use the notions of decreasing (increasing, and constant) absolute risk
aversion (DARA, IARA, and CARA, respectively), de￿ned the standard way
as −u00(x)/u0(x) being decreasing (increasing, and constant, respectively).
All our results carry through in a more general class of utility functions,
u(w,θ), where the buyer￿s wealth (w = initial wealth minus possible pay-
m e n t s )a n dt h ev a l u eo ft h eo b j e c t( θ when winning, 0 otherwise) enter as
two separate arguments. In this case we require u0
i > 0,a n du00
ij < 0 for
i,j ∈ {1,2} for risk aversion. The Arrow-Pratt measure of aversion to risk




∂w,a n dd e c r e a s -
ing (increasing, or constant) absolute risk aversion should be interpreted as
r(w,θ) decreasing (increasing, or constant) in θ. This said, to simplify no-
tation we will not use the broader class of utility functions in this paper;
instead we will follow the majority of the auction literature in expressing the
object￿s value in monetary terms.
10Matthews (1987) notes that this property directly follows from Theorem 5 of Mil-
grom and Weber (1982), which states: If X1,...,Xn are aﬃliated and h(x1,...,xn) is non-
decreasing in its arguments then E[h(X1,...,Xn)|a1 ≤ X1 ≤ b1,...,an ≤ Xn ≤ bn] is
non-decreasing in a1,...,an,b 1,...,bn. For the property mentioned in the text, apply the
theorem to F(y |θi) ≡ E[1{maxj6=i{θj}≤y}| θi].
11Note that we allow the ˜ zi￿s to be correlated, or even ˜ zi ≡ ˜ z for all i.
72.1 Main results: precautionary bidding
We now analyze how DARA buyers￿ behavior and indirect utility changes as
a result of more white noise being added to their aﬃliated private valuations.
In particular, we will compare two situations, one where ˜ zi ≡ 0 (deterministic
valuations), and another where ˜ zi is an independent random variable with
zero mean and ￿nite variance (noisy valuations). We will show that DARA
buyers end up being better oﬀ when noise is present in their valuations in
each of the four most common auction forms: the English or button-, the
￿rst-price, the second-price, and the all-pay auction.12
Proposition 1 establishes that in the presence of noise the buyers reduce
their bids by more than the appropriate risk premium in the second-price
auction (SPA); and that consequently, DARA buyers are better oﬀ with risk
i nb o t ht h eS P Aa n di nt h eE n g l i s ha u c t i o n .U n l i k ei nt h ec a s eo ft h e￿rst-
price auction (FPA) or the all-pay auction (APA) there is no strategic eﬀect
stemming from decreasing risk aversion.
Proposition 1 In the second-price auction with noisy valuations, decreas-
ingly risk-averse buyers bid θi −π0,w h e r eπ0 satis￿es Eu(˜ zi +π0)=0 .C o n -
sequently, the (ex interim) expected utility of DARA buyers is higher with
noisy rather than deterministic valuations in both the SPA and the English
auction (button-auction).
Proof. In the SPA it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid one￿s valuation
when the valuations are deterministic.
Now assume that the valuations are noisy. Suppose that buyer i bids
b>θi − π0 (where π0 is as de￿ned in the claim). His monetary surplus
conditional on winning diﬀers from the surplus he would receive by bidding
θi−π0 only if b(2) > θi−π0,w h e r eb(2) is the second highest bid. He wins the
object with a bid of b, while he would have lost it with a bid of θi − π0.H i s
utility from winning with bid b is Eu(θi +˜ zi −b(2)) < Eu(˜ zi +π0)=0 ,w h i c h
is worse than not winning. A symmetric argument establishes that buyer i
can only be worse oﬀ by bidding b<θi − π0 instead of θi − π0 by missing
pro￿table opportunities.
12The results are con￿ned to comparing noisy and deterministic valuations, but imme-
diately extend to situations where another independent noise is added to make already
noisy valuations still riskier. This is so because the DARA property is preserved under
addition of independent mean-zero noise (see Kihlstrom, Romer, and Williams, 1981).
8However, π0 is greater than the risk premium necessary to compensate
i￿s utility for ˜ zi conditional on winning because he pays less for the object
than his bid (except in case of a tie), and his risk aversion is decreasing in
his ￿nal wealth. This proves the claim that DARA bidders are better oﬀ in
the SPA with noisy rather than deterministic valuations.
Finally, the same statement is true for the English (button-) auction be-
cause the SPA and the button-auction are outcome equivalent under private
values.
In Lemma 2 below attention is restricted to symmetric deterministic direct
mechanisms ￿ direct mechanisms that have the form {G,b,a}. G(ˆ θi,θi) is the
expected probability of buyer i winning the object with a type-announcement
ˆ θi and a true type θi; b(ˆ θi) is the transfer this buyer pays conditional on
winning, and a(ˆ θi) is the transfer he pays conditional on losing. Note that
both payments depend on i￿s own announcement only and are assumed to
be deterministic, so these mechanisms do not represent all mechanisms. Our
goal is merely to prove a claim that can be specialized to prove statements
on the FPA and the APA (Propositions 3 and 4), mechanisms that do satisfy
these conditions.13
Lemma 2 Consider two symmetric deterministic direct mechanisms with
t h es a m ea l l o c a t i o nr u l eG and providing the same utility for the lowest type θ.
Let these two mechanisms be {G,b,a} and {G,β,α}.A s s u m et h a t{G,b,a}
is incentive compatible under deterministic valuations, and {G,β,α} is in-
c e n t i v ec o m p a t i b l ew i t hag i v e ns p e c i ￿cation of noisy valuations. Assume that
t h eb u y e r sh a v eD A R Ap r e f e r e n c e sa n dt h a ta,b,α,β are continuous.
If α(θi) ≤ a(θi) and ∂
∂θiG(x,θi) ≤ 0 for all θi, where the utilities that θi
receives in the two mechanisms equal, then buyers are better oﬀ in mechanism
{G,β,α} with noisy valuations than in mechanism {G,b,a} with determin-
istic valuations.
Proof. In mechanism {G,b,a} with deterministic values, buyer i￿s utility
from announcing ˆ θi w h e nh i st r u et y p ei sθi c a nb ew r i t t e na s
U(ˆ θi,θi)=G(ˆ θi,θi)u(θi − b(ˆ θi)) + [1 − G(ˆ θi,θi)]u(−a(ˆ θi)).
13The method of proof is similar to the envelope-theorem type of arguments widely used
in the literature starting with Milgrom and Weber (1982).
9Let V (θi) ≡ U(θi,θi),t h a ti s ,
V (θi)=G(θi,θi)u(θi − b(θi)) + [1 − G(θi,θi)]u(−a(θi)). (1)










In mechanism {G,β,α} with noisy valuations, let buyer i￿s expected
utility from announcing ˆ θi w h e nh i st r u et y p ei sθi be ˜ U(ˆ θi,θi),a n dl e t
˜ V (θi) ≡ ˜ U(θi,θi).W eh a v e
˜ V (θi)=G(θi,θi)Eu(θi +˜ zi − β(θi)) + [1 − G(θi,θi)]u(−α(θi)), (3)




2(θi,θi)[ Eu(θi +˜ zi − β(θi)) − u(−α(θi))]
+ G(θi,θi)Eu
0(θi +˜ zi − β(θi)). (4)
De￿ne π(θi), the risk premium compensating the winner￿s utility, as
u(θi − b(θi)) ≡ Eu(θi +˜ zi − b(θi)+π(θi)).
By decreasing absolute risk aversion,
u
0(θi − b(θi)) < Eu
0(θi +˜ zi − b(θi)+π(θi)). (5)
Now compare (1) and (3). If V (θi)=˜ V (θi) and α(θi) ≤ a(θi) for some θi
then β(θi) ≥ b(θi) − π(θi). Hence the bracketed diﬀerence in the ￿rst term
of (2) is not less than the corresponding diﬀerence in (4),
u(θi − b(θi)) − u(−a(θi)) ≥ Eu(θi +˜ zi − β(θi)) − u(−α(θi)).
Since G0
2(θi,θi) ≤ 0 by assumption, the ￿rst term in the expression for V 0(θi)
is less than or equal to the ￿rst term in the expression for ˜ V 0(θi).
By (5) and β(θi) ≥ b(θi) − π(θi),
u
0(θi − b(θi)) < Eu
0(θi +˜ zi − β(θi)).
10Hence the second term in (2) is strictly less than the second term in (4).
We conclude that under the hypotheses of the Lemma, if V (θi)=˜ V (θi)
for some θi ∈ (θ,¯ θ), then V 0(θi) < ˜ V 0(θi).
By assumption, V (θ)=˜ V (θ) and for all θi ∈ (θ,¯ θ), V (θi)=˜ V (θi)
implies V 0(θi) < ˜ V 0(θi).I ti se a s yt os h o wt h a tV (θi) < ˜ V (θi) follows for all
θi ∈ (θ,¯ θ].
Now we can prove,
Proposition 3 Consider a ￿rst-price sealed bid auction with aﬃliated pri-
vate values. Then decreasingly risk-averse buyers are better oﬀ with noisy
rather than deterministic valuations.
Proof. FPA belongs to the class of auctions represented by symmetric
deterministic direct mechanisms. The bidder￿s actual bid function is b(θi)
[β(θi)] under deterministic [noisy] values is and a(θi)=α(θi) ≡ 0.
By the assumption that Eu(θ +˜ z) > 0 all buyers participate in the FPA
under deterministic or noisy valuations. The outcome will be eﬃcient because
the unique equilibrium of the FPA consists of symmetric increasing strategies
(Maskin and Riley [1984], Theorem 2, applies under both deterministic and
noisy values). Hence G(ˆ θi,θi) ≡ F(ˆ θi |θi),w h e r eF(ˆ θi|θi) is the conditional
distribution of maxj6=i{θj}j6=i given θi.B ya ﬃliation, G0
2(.,θi) ≤ 0.
The hypothesis of Lemma 2 holds and therefore the claim follows.
The same result goes through for the all-pay auction provided that a sym-
metric equilibrium in increasing strategies exists in that game. The existence
of an equilibrium of the APA is not guaranteed with aﬃliated signals; see
Krishna and Morgan (1997).
Proposition 4 Consider an all-pay auction with aﬃliated private values and
suppose that a symmetric equilibrium in increasing strategies exists under
both deterministic and noisy private values. Then decreasingly risk-averse
buyers are better oﬀ with noisy rather than deterministic valuations.
Proof. All types participate and use a symmetric increasing bid function;
therefore G(ˆ θi,θi) ≡ F(ˆ θi|θi) and G0
2(.,θi) ≤ 0 by aﬃliation. The actual bid
function corresponds to b(θi) ≡ a(θi) and β(θi) ≡ α(θi) in the determin-
istic and noisy cases, respectively. Note that when type θi￿s utility under
11deterministic valuations equals that under noisy valuations in the APA, we
have
F(θi|θi)u(θi − b(θi)) + [1 − F(θi |θi)]u(−b(θi))
= F(θi |θi)Eu(θi +˜ zi − β(θi)) + [1 − F(θi |θi)]u(−β(θi)),
and therefore b(θi) ≥ β(θi) ≥ b(θi) − π(θi);s oα(θi) ≤ a(θi) holds as well.
The hypothesis of Lemma 2 holds and therefore the claim follows.
To summarize the results of this section: decreasingly risk-averse individ-
uals bidding for an object in most common auction formats will be better
oﬀ if the object￿s value becomes more risky. The intuition behind the result
for the ￿rst-price and all-pay auctions is that when the object becomes risky,
bidders￿ marginal utility of an extra dollar of income when they win will rise,
and this eﬀect will make them want to shade their bids in the presence of risk.
The eﬀect follows from the same property of the utility function which gen-
erates precautionary saving (i.e. U(.)000 > 0) in response to uncertain future
income, and so by analogy we call the eﬀect precautionary bidding. When
bidders have decreasing risk aversion (strictly stronger than U(.)000 > 0), the
increase in marginal utility due to risk persists even after bidders have been
compensated by the amount of their risk premium (Kimball 1990), so that
bids are reduced by more than the risk premium and the precautionary bid-
ding eﬀect is large enough to make bidders better oﬀ.14 In the second-price
and English auctions the result follows more directly from the fact that the
risk premium is decreasing.
Interestingly, numerical calculations (available from the authors) show
that the same result does not hold in the optimal auction.15 Depending
on the parameters, bidders may either gain or lose when the object for sale
becomes riskier; and there appear to be no general results available. We
conjecture that the reason for this is that the optimal auction can be thought
of as a ￿two instrument￿ auction, as opposed to the common auction formats,
which are ￿single instrument￿ mechanisms in the sense explained below.
14Note that the discussion in this paragraph suggests that risk-averse bidders with
U(.)000 < 0 could bid strictly more for a risky object than for a safe one. We do not
pursue this possibility because we do not regard such strongly increasing risk aversion as
empirically plausible.
15For an analysis of the optimal auction with decreasingly risk-averse bidders, see Maskin
and Riley (1984). Matthews (1983) analyses the case of constant absolute risk-aversion.
12One way of looking at the results for the common auction formats is that
bidders with low signals are less able to bear the risk on the object than
bidders with higher signals. When risk is added, the low types reduce their
bids (the single instrument) by more than the amount which the high types
would require to keep them indiﬀerent to imitating the low types. Therefore
the high types get more utility from imitating low types and hence more
utility than they did from the riskless auction. This must be so in single
instrument auctions. But in the optimal auction the auctioneer has ￿two
instruments￿. Although the auctioneer must reduce the expected payment
made by low types, he can also redistribute this between payments when
bidders lose and payments when they win. This is what makes the eﬀect of
risk on bidders￿ welfare ambiguous in the optimal auction. In choosing the
appropriate combination of the two instruments, the seller faces the familiar
trade-oﬀ between rent extraction and insurance. The intuition can be gained
by considering a model with only two types of bidders: high value and low
value. Raising the low type￿s payment when he wins and reducing it when
he loses provides him with more insurance, so raising his total expected
payment. But it also makes the low type￿s allocation more attractive to the
high type, so reducing the expected payment which can be extracted from the
latter. When risk is added to the object and the auction is then reoptimized,
a given level of insurance for the low type allows less rent extraction from the
high type than before, so the seller￿s optimal response to risk is to provide less
insurance for the low-type. However, it is ambiguous whether the reduction
in insurance is suﬃcient to actually reduce the welfare of the higher type.
2.2 Comparison of auctions in the presence of noise
In the ￿rst part of this section we saw that in all traditional auction forms
risk-averse buyers reduce their bids by more than their risk premium when
their valuations are noisy. The size of this eﬀect is potentially substantial:
in the SPA and English auction, bids are reduced by the amount of the risk
premium if bidders had zero surplus.16 But the magnitude of this eﬀect
varies across auction forms and we might wonder how the auction forms are
ranked (either from the seller￿s or the buyers￿ point of view) when valuations
16Numerical computations were performed for the ￿rst-price auction using CRRA bid-
ders (details available from the authors). The diﬀerence between the actual bid functions
and hypothetical bid functions (where bids were reduced by the compensating risk pre-
mium) was shown to be as much as 10-15% of actual bids.
13are noisy. In particular, does the diﬀerential reduction in the bids alter
the preference ordering of the seller (or the buyers) over the diﬀerent auction
forms, relative to the situation when noise is not present? Let us now address
this issue.
In fact, the answer is very simple: the results developed under deter-
ministic valuations carry through. The presence of noise will not alter the
ranking of diﬀerent auction forms in the preferences of either the seller or
DARA buyers. The seller￿s preferences are considered in Milgrom and We-
ber (1982), and Maskin and Riley (1984). It is shown that the seller prefers
the ￿rst-price auction over the second-price auction under independent pri-
vate values with risk-averse (not necessarily DARA) buyers. The buyers￿
preferences over auction forms are established by Matthews (1987). Under
independent private values he shows that DARA buyers prefer the SPA over
the FPA.17 Note that both results are only valid for independent valuations;
in contrast, aﬃliation of the buyers￿ signals will improve the expected rev-
enue and decrease the DARA buyers￿ utility in the SPA relative to the FPA
due to the linkage principle (Milgrom and Weber [1982]; Matthews [1987]).
The two results remain true with noisy valuations because both risk aver-
sion and the DARA property are preserved after the introduction of noise
(i.e., the two properties are preserved under expectations - see Pratt [1964]).
This is a straightforward combination of existing results, but for the sake of
clarity and completeness we state them formally in Proposition 5.
In Proposition 5 we also complete the preferences of (decreasingly risk
averse) buyers over traditional auction forms by proving that they prefer the
￿rst-price auction to the all-pay auction. (This result is true more generally,
under aﬃliated private values). To the best of our knowledge this result is
not reported elsewhere in the literature. The expected-revenue comparison
of the FPA and the APA with risk-averse buyers is not known.
Proposition 5 Assume that the buyers are risk averse and have iid private
values augmented by a symmetric additive ex post noise. The seller gets more
revenue from every type of every buyer in the FPA than in the SPA.
If the buyers￿ preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion then
they prefer the SPA to the FPA, and the FPA to the APA. (The last relation
17Under independent private values the English and second-price auctions are outcome-
equivalent. Therefore both the seller and the buyers are indiﬀerent between these two
formats.
14remains true under aﬃliation, provided that an increasing equilibrium exists
in the APA.)
Proof. The ￿rst two results follow from the cited literature and the
fact that both risk aversion and the DARA property are preserved under
expectation (Pratt [1964]).
Now we prove that under aﬃliated private values, buyers with DARA
preferences prefer the ￿rst-price auction to the all-pay auction.
Denote the equilibrium bid function in the APA by b(θi) and the equilib-
rium bid function in the FPA by β(θi). The utility of type θi pretending ˆ θi
in the all-pay auction is,
U
APA(ˆ θi,θi)=G(ˆ θi,θi)Eu(θi +˜ z − b(ˆ θi)) + [1 − G(ˆ θi,θi)]u(−b(ˆ θi)),
where G(ˆ θi,θi) is his expected probability of winning. Letting V (θi) ≡




2(θi,θi)[Eu(θi +˜ z − b(θi)) − u(−b(θi))] + G(θi,θi)Eu
0(θi +˜ z − b(θi)).
(6)
Similarly construct UFPA(ˆ θi,θi)=G(ˆ θi,θi)Eu(θi +˜ z − β(ˆ θi)), and de￿ne




2(θi,θi)Eu(θi +˜ z − β(θi)) + G(θi,θi)Eu
0(θi +˜ z − β(θi)). (7)
Note that V (θ)=W(θ). Suppose V (θi)=W(θi) at some θi ∈ (θ,¯ θ).
Then, obviously, 0 ≤ b(θi) ≤ β(θi),a n d
Eu(θi +˜ z − β(θi)) ≤ Eu(θi +˜ z − b(θi)) − u(−b(θi)), (8)
since u(0) = 0 and u0 > 0. By (8) and G0
2 ≤ 0 (aﬃliation), the ￿rst term in
(7) is not less than that in (6). Since b(θi) ≤ β(θi), the second term in (7)
is strictly greater than its counterpart in (6) by the DARA-property. Hence
V 0(θi) <W 0(θi) whenever V (θi)=W(θi) at some θi > θ. We conclude that
V (θi) <W(θi) for all θi ∈ (θ,¯ θ].
2.3 Testable predictions
In this section we consider the empirical implications of our model and how
it might be tested. The immediate prediction that DARA bidders are better
15oﬀ bidding for a risky object will certainly not be easy to verify. For a direct
test one would need an accurate estimate of both the degree of bidders￿ risk
aversion and the riskiness of the object, and estimating these parameters is
ad i ﬃcult econometric exercise. The joint identi￿cation of the degree of risk
aversion and the distribution of signals is already problematic: see Campo
et al (2000) for a recent attempt to tackle this problem.
An indirect but simpler test of our model would be to consider the pop-
ularity of an auction. If bidders are better oﬀ in risky auctions then one
should expect to see more entry into such auctions. Suppose that bidders
must choose between attending several auctions, for example because they
have only a limited amount of time available. (This seems to be a reasonable
description of entry into on-line auctions such as eBay.) Then in equilibrium
we should see more bidders entering auctions which are riskier as bidder sur-
plus must be equalized across auctions. This may explain the apparent puzzle
as to why internet auctions are so popular despite the great risks associated
with buying merchandise from a seller that one has never met. Our model
suggests that it is precisely the riskiness of the auction which generates its
popularity. A given number of bidders would gain from the presence of risk
because the bids would be reduced by an amount which more than compen-
sates them for the risk. Hence with endogenous entry, risky auctions must
attract more bidders.18
Another situation which would yield the same result ￿ that risky auctions
attract more bidders ￿ is where any entry cost has to be paid before bidders
observe their types. For example, in forestry auctions a major component
of the cost of bidding is the cost of paying a ￿cruiser￿ to visit the tract and
estimate its value before the auction, so that the cost of entry is sunk before
the value of the object is known. Then tracts which are thought to be risky
(e.g. because lack of roads makes it diﬃcult to observe the diﬀerent species
of trees when cruising) should attract more interest from bidders for any
given expected value. Similar remarks could apply to bidding for oil tracts
(where the main cost is drilling to ￿nd out one￿s estimate of the value of
18Another formulation which would work in the same way is that bidders can only bid
on a limited number of objects because of eligibility restrictions. For example, to bid in
some auctions, bidders must put up a deposit on each item on which they are intending
to bid to display their seriousness as bidders. Liquidity constraints would then eﬀectively
limit the number of items on which they can bid. In the Australian Spectrum auctions,
bidders were asked to state in advance the maximum number of licences in which they
were interested and paid an entry fee accordingly.
16the tract). By contrast, consider the case when entry costs are paid after
the bidders learn their type (as is commonly assumed in the literature,19 but
which actually seems to be less realistic in many applications). Then risk will
still lead to precautionary bidding but the lowest types of bidders may not
attend the risky auction - so that the net eﬀect of risk on entry is ambiguous.
Note that although risk will reduce a seller￿s revenue with a ￿xed number
of bidders, the overall eﬀect with an endogenous number of bidders is less
clear. This is because risk generates entry - especially by high types, in the
case where bidders know their types before the entry decision - and this will
tend to raise equilibrium bids. We leave this as a topic for future research.
3 Extension to common values
In this section we extend the analysis to a model where the valuations on
which the ex post noise is imposed already have a common value component.
We show that the earlier results go through in an aﬃliated common values
model for the SPA and the FPA.
We modify the model of the previous section by allowing the buyers￿ de-
terministic valuations to depend on each others￿ signals. We assume that
buyer i￿s deterministic valuation is v(θi,{θj}j6=i). Note that a buyer￿s valu-
ation depends only on the collection of signals of the other bidders (besides
his own), not on the identities of the other bidders. An alternative notation
(used by Milgrom and Weber [1982] and others) would be to write the valu-
ation function as v(X1,Y 1,...,Yn−1),w h e r eX1 stands for i￿s own signal (θi),
and Yk stands for the kth highest among the other bidders￿ signals (θ
(k)
−i). In
any case, we assume that v is strictly increasing in the buyer￿s own signal
and weakly increasing in all other signals.20
The ex post stochastic part of the valuation, ˜ zi,i st h es a m ea si nt h e
previous section: it is a zero-mean random variable drawn from a symmet-
ric joint distribution that is independent of (θi,θ−i). The buyer￿s ex post
stochastic valuation for the object is then v(θi,{θj}j6=i)+˜ zi. We will say
that the buyers have deterministic (or noisy) valuations when ˜ zi ≡ 0 (or
when ˜ zi is non-degenerate, respectively). We continue to assume that the
19A notable exception is Levin and Smith (1994) who analyze the type of model we
describe above, where bidders must pay their entry costs before they receive their signal.
20The deterministic part of the valuations is equivalent to the (expected) valuations in
the general symmetric aﬃliated model of Milgrom and Weber (1982).
17object is valuable even for the lowest type, Eu(v(θ,...,θ)+˜ zi) > 0.
As a preparation, de￿ne
ˆ u(w; x,y) ≡ E[u(v(θi,{θj}j6=i)+w)|θi = x, θ
(1)
−i = y]. (9)
where u(.) is strict DARA. We will use three key properties of this function:
1. ˆ u is strictly increasing in x, weakly in y,a n di ti sac o n c a v e ,s t r i c t l y
increasing utility function in variable w.
2. For x0 >x(but holding y = θ
(1)
−i ￿xed), ˆ u(w; x0,y) is less risk-averse in
w than is ˆ u(w; x,y) for all levels of w. Similarly, ˆ u(w; x,y0) is less risk-
averse than is ˆ u(w; x,y) iﬀ y>y 0. These properties follow because,
by aﬃliation, the random variable v(θi,{θj}j6=i) given θi,θ
(1)
−i increases
both in θi and θ
(1)
−i in the monotone likelihood ratio sense and therefore
the resulting expected utility function, ˆ u, will exhibit a lower level of
risk aversion in w for a higher θi or θ
(1)
−i (this is due to Jewitt [1987];
see also Eeckhoudt et al. [1996] and Athey [2000]).
3. The functions − ∂
∂xˆ u(w; x,y) and − ∂
∂yˆ u(w; x,y) are concave utility
functions as well, and both exhibit a higher level of risk aversion in w
than does ˆ u(w; x,y). This property directly follows from the previous
one combined with the observation that decreasing absolute risk aver-
sion of a utility function is equivalent to the negative of the marginal
utility being more risk-averse than the utility function (Kimball [1990]).
We now prove the counterpart of Proposition 1 in the general symmetric
aﬃliated model.
Proposition 6 Consider the general symmetric aﬃliated model with de-
creasingly risk-averse buyers. The buyers are better oﬀ with noisy rather
than deterministic valuations in the symmetric equilibria of the second-price
auction and the English auction.
Proof. First consider the SPA with deterministic common values. Let










0 (θi);θi,θi)=0 , (10)
w h i c hm e a n s ,b y( 9 ) ,t h a tπCV
0 (θi) compensates bidder θi for the common
value risk conditional on θ
(1)
−i = θi at zero surplus:
E[u(v(θi,{θj}j6=i) − ¯ v(θi,θi)+π
CV
0 (θi)) | θi, θ
(1)
−i = θi]=0 .
We claim that a symmetric increasing equilibrium exists, and it consists
of bid functions
b(θi)=¯ v(θi,θi) − π
CV
0 (θi). (11)
It is easy to check that b(θi) is strictly increasing. To establish that it is
best response to {b(θj)}j6=i,s u p p o s e ,t o w a r d sc o n t r a d i c t i o n ,t h a ti bids b>
¯ v(θi,θi)−πCV
0 (θi) instead of (11). This makes a diﬀerence only if, for θ
(1)
−i = y,
b>b (y) > ¯ v(θi,θi) − πCV
0 (θi).T h e ni will receive, instead of 0,
E[u(v(θi,{θj}j6=i) − ¯ v(y,y)+π
CV
0 (y)) | θi, θ
(1)
−i = y] <
E[u(v(y,{θj}j6=i) − ¯ v(y,y)+π
CV
0 (y)) | θi = θ
(1)
−i = y]=0 ,
Hence bidding b>¯ v(θi,θi) − πCV
0 (θi) is not a good idea. An analogous
argument works against bidding b<¯ v(θi,θi) − πCV
0 (θi). Therefore (11) is
indeed an increasing equilibrium.21
If valuations are risky then in the symmetric equilibrium buyer θi bids
β(θi)=¯ v(θi,θi) − π
CV




0 (θi)+˜ zi + π0(θi);θi,θi)=0 . (13)
That is, type θi further reduces his bid by the compensating risk premium
for ˜ zi at the risky initial wealth (risky due to the common value risk) that
21With risk neutrality the equilibrium bid is ¯ v(θi,θi).W eh a v es h o w nt h a ti nt h ec a s eo f
DARA bidders it is reduced by the risk premium πCV
0 (θi), which compensates the buyer
for the risk of the others￿ signals at zero expected surplus.
19gives him zero surplus. The derivation is identical to that of the equilibrium
under deterministic valuations, (11), and therefore is omitted.
For all y ≤ x,b yp r o p e r t y2o f( 9 ) ,
ˆ u(−¯ v(y,y)+π
CV
0 (y);x,y) ≤ Ezˆ u(−¯ v(y,y)+π
CV
0 (y)+˜ zi + π0(y);x,y)
(14)
because ˆ u(w; y,y)=Ezˆ u(w +˜ zi + π0(y);y,y) at w = −¯ v(y,y)+πCV
0 (y) by
de￿nition (compare (10) and (13)). But (14) is equivalent to








−i)) | θi, θ
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−i)+˜ zi + π0(θ
(1)





−i ≤ θi,a n dt h e r e f o r e








−i)) | θi, θ
(1)
−i ≤ θi]








−i)+˜ zi + π0(θ
(1)
−i)) | θi, θ
(1)
−i ≤ θi].
By de￿nition, this means that buyer θi is better oﬀ with noise ˜ zi and bidding
β(θi), as compared to having no noise but bidding b(θi).
We now turn to the proof in the case of the English auction. In the
eﬃcient symmetric equilibrium with deterministic values, buyer i plans to
quit at v(θi,θ−i), such that for all active j 6= i, θj = θi, and for all inactive
j 6= i, θj equals j￿s true type. By strict monotonicity of v in θi,l o w e rt y p e s
plan to quit earlier. When a buyer drops out, the other buyers infer his type
and repeat the above calculation until only one buyer remains active. The
winner will therefore pay v(x,θ−i) at x = θ
(1)
−i, which is (weakly) less than
his actual valuation because θi ≥ θ
(1)
−i.
With noisy valuations, buyer i plans to quit at v(θi,θ−i) − π0 such that
for all active j 6= i, θj = θi,f o ra l li n a c t i v ej 6= i, θj equals j￿s true type, and
π0 solves u(0) = Eu(˜ zi + π0). The winner pays v(x,θ−i) − π0 at x = θ
(1)
−i.
Since the deterministic part of his surplus is non-negative, the compensating
risk premium for noise ˜ zi is less than π0, and he ends up being better oﬀ.
The following is the counterpart of Proposition 3.
Proposition 7 Consider the general symmetric aﬃliated model with de-
creasingly risk-averse buyers. The buyers are better oﬀ with noisy rather
than deterministic valuations in the symmetric equilibrium of the ￿rst-price
auction.
20Proof. Let the equilibrium bid function under deterministic and noisy
values be b(θi) and β(θi), respectively. Under deterministic values, in equi-













−i |θi) is the probability density function of θ
(1)
−i conditional on θi.























Similarly, if ˜ V (θi) denotes θi￿s indirect expected utility under noisy values in







































The expression in brackets is weakly increasing in θ
(1)
−i whenever it is non-
positive by property 3 of ˆ u, while its expected value is 0; therefore the
integrand switches sign only once, from negative to positive (it is quasi-





−i|θi) is increasing in θ
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non-negative integral (an easy proof can be given along the lines of Lemma
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and so the second term in (16) is not less than that in (15).




















and therefore V 0(θi) < ˜ V 0(θi).S i n c eV (θ)=˜ V (θ)=0 , and, as we have just
shown, V (θi)=˜ V (θi) implies V 0(θi) < ˜ V 0(θi) for all θi ∈ (θ,¯ θ),w em u s th a v e
V (θi) < ˜ V (θi) for all θi ∈ (θ,¯ θ]. This proves the claim.
We also note that a counterpart to Proposition 4 (precautionary bidding
in the all-pay auction) can be proven under the assumptions of interdepen-
dent (common) values and independent signals.
4 When the winner￿s curse is a blessing
Up until now we have shown how an exogenous mean-zero risk causes de-
creasingly risk-averse bidders to engage in precautionary bidding. However,
it is easy to see that the eﬀect is more general than this, and that other
forms of risk are likely to cause the same sort of behavior. In particular, in
common-value contexts, the object is risky for the buyer because when he
wins he does not necessarily know the signals of the other buyers, and these
aﬀect his valuation.
In this section we show that precautionary bidding eﬀect arises in this
set-up when valuations are stochastic only because of these common-value
components. This is novel because the behavior of risk-averse bidders in
common-value auctions is not well understood as such models are not read-
ily tractable. We also show that it is possible for decreasingly risk-averse
buyers to be better oﬀ when they face a winner￿s curse than when they are
in an equivalent private values auction because they ￿underbid￿ due to pre-
cautionary bidding. This means that in equilibrium, the winner￿s curse is
often not in fact a curse but a blessing for DARA bidders, something which
cannot occur with risk-neutral bidders.
This is a relevant insight for theory because it can help us better under-
stand the behavior of risk-averse bidders in common value settings. But it is
also of practical importance, because in some settings bidders may be able to
choose between entering auctions where they will face a signi￿cant winner￿s
curse and those where they will not. In some cases this may be a straight
22choice about what type of object to buy: other things being equal, should I
bid for a painting by a known artist for which the estimate of the resale value
(common to all bidders) is likely to be important, or one by a lesser known
artist which is valued merely for its aesthetic appeal? Conventional economic
wisdom suggests that one should be wary of the former option because of the
signi￿cant ￿winner￿s curse;￿ our results suggest that if bidders are DARA,
this is not true.
In other cases, whether the auction of a given object is largely a private or
common values aﬀair may be determined by prior moves taken by the bidders.
For example, consider two ￿rms which will later compete in procurement
auctions. If ￿ prior to the auctions ￿ these two ￿rms choose similar production
technologies, then the subsequent auctions will have a strong common-value
component: one ￿rm￿s estimate of the likely cost of ful￿lling the contract is
likely to be important information for the other ￿rm. But if the two ￿rms
choose two very diﬀerent technologies to one another, then the ￿rst ￿rm￿s
likely cost of production may not be relevant at all to the second ￿rm￿s costs,
and vice versa: then the auctions will take place in a private values setting.
The results of this section suggest that if the ￿rms are DARA,22 they may be
better oﬀ choosing technologies which are ￿too correlated￿ (from the seller￿s
and perhaps the social point of view) in order to bene￿tf r o mt h es o f t e n e d
bidding which the winner￿s curse risk generates. Similar remarks could apply
to the choice of customer base by car, art, wine and antique retailers who buy
their product in wholesale auctions: ceteris paribus if they choose to serve
customers with similar tastes, the common-value risk will be larger, because
when bidding in auctions they will all be interested in estimating the same
properties of the objects for sale. This reduction in competition eﬀect would
counteract the bidders￿ desire to diﬀerentiate themselves to avoid excessive
competition in the retail market.
In the next subsection, we demonstrate using an example which permits
22For a model of why ￿rms in imperfect capital markets will tend to display decreasing
absolute risk aversion, see Froot and Stein (1998), and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993).
The basic insight is that the ￿rm will appear risk-averse to variations in cash ￿ow if each
unit of external funds is increasingly costly to raise, because variance of internal cash ￿ow
raises expected external ￿nancing costs for given a investment plan. But the ￿rm will be
less averse to a given risk in cash ￿ows if it begins with more internal capital (￿wealth￿),
because it is unlikely to have to raise very large amounts of external ￿nance: it can use
its internal capital to fund its investments even if cash ￿ows are low. This very naturally
yields behaviour which is equivalent to decreasing absolute risk aversion.
23an analytic solution that the precautionary eﬀect (arising from the noise
due to other buyers￿ signals) may overcompensate the winner￿s curse and
so the buyers may end up better oﬀ in a common values auction compared
to a private values situation. In subsection 4.2 we provide a more formal
demonstration that it is decreasing absolute risk aversion which is driving
the result.
4.1 A numerical example
Suppose that there are two potential buyers for a given object. The buy-
ers￿ private information, θi for i =1 ,2, is independently and uniformly dis-
tributed on [0,1]. Assume that the buyers have CRRA(ρ) preferences, that is,
they evaluate a stochastic monetary payoﬀ, x, according to E[(x)1−ρ/(1 − ρ)],
where 0 < ρ < 1.
We will consider a ￿rst price auction (FPA) and compare the behavior
of the buyers when their monetary valuations for the object are: (i) private,
vi ≡ θi, and: (ii) pure common, vi =( θi + θ−i)/2. We will explicitly
calculate, for each case separately, the symmetric equilibrium bid functions
and the buyers￿ expected utility from participating in the auction. We will
show that for high values of ρ (ρ > ¯ ρ ≈ 0.745) the buyers are better oﬀ in
the common values auction than in the private values auction.
There are two con￿icting forces driving this result: the reduction in in-
formational rent and precautionary bidding. Suppose that we move from
the private values setup to the common values setup. On the one hand, the
value of each bidder￿s private information becomes smaller. This increases
competition and thus increases bids - and it is the only eﬀect which arises
for risk-neutral bidders. On the other hand, introducing common values also
makes the value of the object riskier. Then DARA bidders will cut their
bids by more than the appropriate risk premium ￿ this is the additional pre-
cautionary bidding eﬀect. We show that for high values of ρ (i.e. more
steeply decreasing risk aversion) the precautionary eﬀect dominates the in-
formational rent eﬀect.
(i) Private values. Denote the symmetric increasing equilibrium bid func-
tion by b(θi).23
23In the setups which we adopt for private and common values, it is well known that
the symmetric equilibrium bid functions exist and are strictly increasing.
24By bidding ˆ bi = b(ˆ θi) against the other player￿s equilibrium strategy,
buyer i with type θi gets an expected utility of
Pr(θ−i < ˆ θi)u(θi − b(ˆ θi)) = ˆ θi(θi − b(ˆ θi))
1−ρ/(1 − ρ).
In equilibrium the maximum is obtained at ˆ θi = θi.T h e ￿rst order condition





, b(0) = 0.
It is easy to check that the solution is b(θi)=θi/(2−ρ).N o t e t h a t a s ρ → 0,
risk neutrality, the bid function becomes B(θi)=1
2θi.
Buyer i￿s utility can be calculated as
U









(ii) Pure common values. Now assume that buyer i￿s valuation for the
object is (θi+θ−i)/2. Let the symmetric increasing equilibrium bid function
be c(θi).
The equilibrium condition is Pr(θ−i < ˆ θi)E[u((θi +θ−i)/2−c(ˆ θi))|θ−i <
θi] maximized at ˆ θi = θi. This, coupled with c(0) = 0, yields the following
diﬀerential equation for c(θi):
c
0(θi)=
(θi − c(θi))1−ρ/(1 − ρ)
R θi
0 [(θi + x)/2 − c(θi)]
−ρ dx
,c (0) = 0.
It is easy to check that the solution is c(θi)=1
2θi. Note that this result
holds for all ρ between 0 and 1, and, in the limit, it holds for risk neutrality:
C(θi)=1
2θi.
Buyer i￿s utility in equilibrium is
U


























25This is true for ρ > ¯ ρ ≈ 0.745.
Notice that in this particular example the total surplus available to be
shared between the seller and the buyers is smaller in the common values
case than in the private values case (i.e. the expected value of the object
to the highest bidder is smaller). It is therefore surprising that the bidders
can be better oﬀ with common values than with private values. Note also
that in the limiting risk neutral case, ρ → 0, the bid function is the same
under private and common values, B(θi)=C(θi). So the winner￿s curse is
borne entirely by the buyers. It is generally true that risk-neutral buyers
must bear at least part of the reduced surplus due to common values. This
is because there is a reduction in the informational rent available to bidders
when moving from private to common values whilst maintaining the same
signal distribution. (In this example, each buyer￿s signal determines only
half as much of his value as before and the other half is competed away by
bidders.) Despite this reduction in informational rent, DARA bidders can be
better oﬀ with common values if their precautionary eﬀect is large enough,
i.e. if risk aversion decreases quickly enough. This suggests that a natural
next step is to ￿nd some way of renormalizing the way in which values are
composed from signals in order to better compare like with like. This is the
task which we undertake in the next subsection.
4.2 Comparison of common and private values
In this subsection we will demonstrate that the result of the previous numeri-
cal example was due to the DARA property displayed by the CRRA bidders.
We show that decreasingly risk-averse buyers are better oﬀ in common values
auctions than in ￿comparable￿ private values auctions.
In order to simplify the analysis, in this subsection we will assume that
the signals are independent.T h a ti s ,θi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are drawn iid from [θ,¯ θ]
according to some distribution F (with positive density f). The advantage
of assuming independence is that the revenue equivalence theorem applies
for risk-neutral bidders, which will greatly facilitate the task of ￿nding com-
parable common and private value auctions.
Suppose that in a common values auction buyer i￿s valuation is v(θi,θ−i).
The ￿rst task is to decide which private values setup is comparable to this
common values model. In order to isolate the precautionary eﬀect from the
reduction in informational rent discussed in section 4.1 above, the appro-
priate comparison seems to be between two settings that yield the same
26informational rent to the bidders. This means that the appropriate private-
value normalization is an auction where buyer i￿s valuation is t(θi) such that
a risk-neutral buyer with signal θi is indiﬀerent between this private values
auction and the original common values auction. We call such a private
values model the risk-neutral private-value equivalent of the common values
auction. We aim to show that whenever a risk-neutral buyer is interim in-
diﬀerent between two auctions - one of them common values and the other
private values - then DARA bidders will strictly prefer to be in the common
values setting (and CARA bidders will be indiﬀerent).
For a common value v(θi,θ−i) we can ￿nd the corresponding private value
t(θi) in the following way. Consider an eﬃcient direct revelation mechanism
that leaves 0 surplus with the lowest type under both common and private
values.24 Denote the utility of type θi in the private values auction by V (θi).





Similarly, by letting W(θi) stand for the utility of type θi in this mechanism







−i ≤ θi],W (θ)=0 ,
where v0
θi(θi,θ−i) ≡ ∂
∂θiv(θi,θ−i). In order to make a risk-neutral bidder
indiﬀerent between the two auctions (the one where his valuation is v(θi,θ−i)







−i ≤ θi],t (θ)=θ. (21)
A particularly tractable example for common values is where the eﬀect
of one￿s own signal and the eﬀects of others￿ signals are additively separable
24Both the FPA and the SPA are examples of mechanisms with this property ￿ there-
fore, we just consider their direct revelation counterpart. This is the advantage of the
independence assumption in this context. Since the revenue equivalence theorem applies,
the private value which makes a risk-neutral bidder indiﬀerent between a common and pri-
vate values ￿rst price auction will be the same as that which makes him indiﬀerent with
a second price auction. Without independence, the risk-neutral equivalents for the two
auctions would have to be separately derived and may not be equal, further complicating
the analysis.
27(a special case of which is the linear model). Additive separability requires
v(θi,θ−i) ≡ g(θi)+h(θ−i), or, after a suitable normalization of the signals,
v(θi,θ−i)=θi + w(θ−i). (22)
It is easy to check that with separable signal eﬀects under common values we
get a risk-neutral equivalent private value t(θi)=θi. The additively separable
formulation is particularly revealing because it highlights the idea (discussed
above) that bidders obtain rents from their own signals only. Although the
expected value of the object is larger in the common values case, the bidders
compete away all the surplus associated with the additional value of the
object which comes from positive realizations of the other bidders￿ signals.
It is interesting to note that if the selling mechanism is the English
(button-) auction then buyers are indiﬀerent between the additively separable
common-value auction and its private-value equivalent, no matter what their
risk preferences (maintaining the assumption of symmetry).25 The intuition
for this is simple: when a bidder wins a common value English (button-)
auction, he knows the value of the object to him exactly because he has seen
the points at which each of his opponents has dropped out. Thus bidders
face no additional risk in the English common values auction relative to the
private values case, and there is no precautionary bidding eﬀect there. This
fact further justi￿es the choice of the private-value equivalent.
In the following two propositions we establish that decreasingly risk-
averse buyers are better oﬀ in a common values auction relative to the com-
parable private values auction when the mechanism is either a ￿rst or a
second price auction. We prove this result under the additive separability
assumption (22) in the case of the SPA, and under slightly more general
circumstances in the case of the FPA.
Proposition 8 Assume that in the iid signals common-value setup the val-
uation function satis￿es (22), additive separability. Decreasingly risk-averse
buyers are better oﬀ in the common values auction relative to the risk-neutral
25When only two buyers remain in the English auction, say θi and θj, they both know all
the other buyers￿ signals (the true ˆ θks, k 6= i,j) from the drop-out prices. In the common
values case they build this information into their valuations and bid θi + w(θi,ˆ θ−ij) and
θj+w(θj,ˆ θ−ij), respectively. Suppose the winner is i, then his utility is u(θi+w(θj,ˆ θ−ij)−
θj −w(θj,ˆ θ−ij)) = u(θi−θj). In the private values case if θi wins then he pays θj yielding
a utility of u(θi −θj). Therefore winner i￿s utility is the same in the common and private
values setups for all realizations of θj.
28equivalent private values auction when the auction mechanism is a second-
price auction.
Proof. De￿ne ¯ v(x,y) and ¯ w(y) in the following way:
¯ v(x,y) ≡ E[v(θi,{θj}j6=i)|θi = x, θ
(1)
−i = y]
= x + E[w({θj}j6=i)| θ
(1)
−i = y] ≡ x +¯ w(y).
De￿ne πCV(x),s o l v i n g




E[u(w({θj}j6=i) − ¯ w(x)+π
CV(x)) | θ
(1)
−i = x]=0 . (23)
That is, πCV(x) compensates the expected utility for the common-value noise
w({θj,∀j 6= i|θ
(1)
−i = x}) − ¯ w(x) at the initial wealth level.
We know from the proof of Proposition 6 that a symmetric increasing
equilibrium exists, and it consists of bid functions
c(θi)=¯ v(θi,θi) − π
CV(θi).
Therefore type θi￿s expected utility is,




















−i ≤ θi, θi]




−i ≤ θi, θi], (24)
where the inequality follows from (23), θi − θ
(1)
−i > 0 almost everywhere, and
the DARA property.
On the other hand, in the risk-neutral equivalent private values auction,
t(θi)=θi, and buyers bid their valuations. Therefore the expected utility of
type θi from the auction is,




−i ≤ θi, θi].
This, together with (24), implies W(θi) >V(θi).
29Proposition 9 Assume that in the iid signals common-value setup the val-
uation function has the property that v0
θi(θi,θ−i) is non-increasing in all θj,
j 6= i.26 Decreasingly risk-averse buyers are better oﬀ in the common values
auction relative to the risk-neutral equivalent private values auction when the
auction mechanism is a ￿rst-price auction.
Proof. The utility of type θi pretending ˆ θi in the equilibrium of the FPA
under common and (comparable) private values is
U
CV(ˆ θi,θi)=F(ˆ θi)
n−1E[u(v(θi,θ−i) − c(ˆ θi))| θ
(1)
−i ≤ ˆ θi],
U
PV(ˆ θi,θi)=F(ˆ θi)
n−1 u(t(θi) − b(ˆ θi)),
respectively, where c(.) and b(.) are the equilibrium bid functions in the two
cases, respectively. Denoting V (θi)=UPV(θi,θi) and W(θi)=UCV(θi,θi),






0(v(θi,θ−i) − c(θi)) | θ
(1)





0(t(θi) − b(θi)). (26)
Whenever V (θi)=W(θi) for some θi ∈ (θ,¯ θ),t h a ti s ,
u(t(θi) − b(θi)) = E[u(v(θi,θ−i) − c(θi))| θ
(1)
−i ≤ θi],
by the DARA property,
u
0(t(θi) − b(θi)) < E[u
0(v(θi,θ−i) − c(θi)) | θ
(1)
−i ≤ θi]. (27)

























The second to last line follows because v0
θi(θi,θ−i) and u0(v(θi,θ−i)−c(θi)) are
non-increasing in θ−i (and therefore non-negatively covary in θ−i); and the
last line follows from (25). This establishes that for θi ∈ (θ,¯ θ], V (θi)=W(θi)
implies V 0(θi) <W0(θi).
Since V (θ)=W(θ),w e￿nd that V (θi) <W(θi) for all θi ∈ (θ,¯ θ],w h i c h
proves the claim.
26In words: the eﬀect of i￿s signal on his own valuation does not increase as others￿
signals become higher. Additive separability is a special case of this model.
305C o n c l u s i o n
We have shown that decreasingly risk-averse bidders are better oﬀ when
the value of the object auctioned becomes more risky. The bidders behave
less aggressively, reducing their bids by more than the amount of the risk
premium. This is true in ￿rst-price and all-pay auctions with stochastic
aﬃliated private values because risk increases the marginal utility of income,
as in the precautionary saving literature; so the trade-oﬀ between raising
one￿s bid to win more often, and reducing it to win with a larger surplus, is
shifted in favor of the latter. The same result holds in ￿rst-price auctions
with aﬃliated common values and in all-pay auctions with common values
and independent signals. We have shown that in second-price and English
auctions also, decreasingly risk-averse bidders will be better oﬀ when the
o b j e c tb e c o m e sm o r er i s k y .T h i si st r u ef o rb o t hp r i v a t ea n dc o m m o nv a l u e s .
The bidders become better oﬀ because their optimal strategy is to bid their
value, less the risk premium of the noise calculated at the initial wealth level.
That is, bidders calculate the risk premium assuming that they will pay their
bid - but most of the time when they win their payment is strictly less than
their bid, so they are better oﬀ.
Our result ￿ the ￿precautionary bidding￿ eﬀect ￿ is not immediately obvi-
ous. Consider, for example, the ￿rst-price auction. Risk (in the value of the
object) typically increases the risk aversion of decreasingly risk-averse bid-
ders, and we know that competition in the FPA intensi￿es when the buyers
become more risk-averse. Therefore one might imagine that increasing the
object￿s riskiness would leave bidders with less surplus than before. However,
the eﬀect of risk on risk aversion turns out to be of second-order importance
compared to the eﬀect on marginal utility.
It is well-known that, with risk-averse bidders, revenue is higher in a ￿rst-
price auction than a second-price auction. This remains true under stochastic
private values, independently of the utility function. However, the advantage
of the ￿rst-price auction over the second-price auction can be diminished
when risk is added; decreasingly risk-averse bidders behave less aggressively
than previously in both auctions, and the eﬀect can be larger in the ￿rst-
price auction than the second-price auction. Moreover, the model presented
here calls into question the result that the seller￿s revenue will be higher in
a ￿rst-price auction when the bidders are more risk-averse. It remains true
that if the object is risky then the fear of losing the object will motivate more
risk-averse bidders to bid more highly. But against this, they will bid less
31highly because they dislike the riskiness of the object, and even less highly
because of the precautionary eﬀect. So it is an open question under exactly
which circumstances the seller will earn higher expected revenue from more
risk-averse bidders.27
The analysis of auctions with risk-averse bidders and common values is
not in general very tractable and for this reason has been very little stud-
ied. However, we have shown that our model of how risk-averse bidders
responding to mean-zero white noise risk can be used to understand the way
in which bidders will react to negative expected value winner￿s curse risk. In
particular, suppose that bidders move from a (certain) private values setting
to a (risky) common values one. Then the precautionary bidding eﬀect will
typically cause bidders to reduce their bids by more than the risk premium
associated with the negative expected value risk. This means that if risk
aversion decreases fast enough then risk-averse bidders will be better oﬀ bid-
ding in a common-values situation than a private-values situation. In other
words, the ￿winner￿s curse￿ turns out to be a bene￿tf o rb i d d e r s !T h i sc a n
never happen with risk-neutral bidders; they will always be worse oﬀ bid-
ding in the common values case because there are fewer informational rents
available for bidders in that case.
We also provided a simple and natural way of renormalizing the social
surplus in auctions that leaves risk-neutral buyers (or any buyers in an En-
glish auction) indiﬀerent between common and private value settings. We
then showed that decreasingly absolute risk-averse buyers will always prefer
the common value setting in this case with ￿rst- or second-price auctions,
precisely because of the precautionary bidding eﬀe c t .T h i si sc l e a r l yr e l e v a n t
to bidders￿ choices about which auctions to attend, and it is not paradoxi-
cal that we see lots of entry by risk-averse bidders into auctions which would
seem to contain a large common value element. Moreover, in situations where
bidders take actions prior to bidding (for example, in procurement auctions,
choosing whether to operate using the same or diﬀerent technologies) the bid-
ders may even be able to choose the extent of the winner￿s curse (common
value) element in the auction. This is because the prior action may determine
for each bidder the relevance of the information available to other bidders.
The further analysis of such two-stage games is a potentially complex but
rewarding proposition which we leave to future research.
27Numerical computations were performed corroborating these claims. The calculations
are available from the authors.
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